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H.L.A. HART: A TWENTIETH-CENTURY OXFORD
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER
Reflections by a Former Student and Colleague
JoHN FINNIs
I
Herbert Hart was born in 1907, a son of prosperous tailors in the north of
England. From the age of eleven he was boarding-schooled in the south, but
after some years was educated near home, at an excellent grammar school
where he finished as Head Prefect, regarded by the Head Master as a head boy
of unsurpassed loyalty and capacity. By competitive scholarship examination
he proceeded to New College, one of the University of Oxford's oldest and
best colleges, where he studied Greek, Latin, ancient history and philosophy,
with brilliant success. Before, during and after his Oxford studies, he
travelled widely throughout Europe; he had a gift for languages and
throughout his life an immense enthusiasm for places, people, and literature.
Passing the Bar exams in late 1930, Hart joined commercial chambers in
Lincoln's Inn where he practiced with notable success, especially in tax
matters. Though he had joined the Inns of Court Regiment early in his career
at the Bar, and participated enthusiastically in stag-hunting and like pursuits,
his political views, always liberal, moved decisively left during the mid-1930s
even before he became associated in 1936 with Jenifer Williams, who had
been a member of the Communist Party since 1934 and in her early years as
a civil servant-which coincided with their beginning to live together-even
had a Soviet controller. But, as she later wrote of Hart (whom she married in
late 1941), "he was strongly opposed to communism both as theory and
practice."'
In June 1940, Hart joined M15, the intelligence organization dedicated to
counter-espionage in Britain. There he worked until the end of the war, on
counter-espionage, on the dissemination of disinformation to the enemy, and
on the processing of results of M16's ultra secret deciphering of the German
codes; he was regarded within M15 as outstandingly able, reliable and acute;
and he patriotically maintained the mandated secrecy about these activities
down to the end of his life.
1. Jenifer Hart, Ask Me No More: An Autobiography (London: Peter Halban, 1998), 72.
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At war's end, Hart returned not to the Bar but to New College, as fellow
and tutor in Philosophy. It was hoped and expected that he would maintain
the anti-empiricist tradition of his Platonist tutor, H.W.B. Joseph, but he soon
gravitated to the modem-minded opposition, the circle of philosophers who
under J.L. Austin's leadership pursued a way of thinking philosophically that
Hart like others was content to call linguistic, or sometimes analytical. Still,
immediately before his election in 1952 to the chair of Jurisprudence, he was
lecturing on Legal and Political Theories in Plato.
Hart's inaugural lecture in 1953 laid out and exemplified an agenda for an
analytical jurisprudence informed by linguistic philosophy, which he
presented as practiced if not inaugurated by Jeremy Bentham. Nevertheless,
as we shall see, his master work The Concept of Law (1961) is not in its deep
structure either linguistic or analytical. Nor does Hart's best-known book,
Law, Liberty & Morality (1963), owe anything to fashions in philosophical
methodology.
In 1968, the year his Punishment andResponsibility appeared and six years
before retirement age, Hart left the chair of Jurisprudence and the university
(though not the family house in central Oxford), feeling he had said all he had
to say.2 He worked for the next five years on editing and commenting in essay
form on Bentham's accounts of law, rights, powers, and legal language; and
continued the quasi-governmental work he had begun in 1966 as a member of
the Monopolies Commission. He returned formally to Oxford University as
Principal of Brasenose College, 1973-78, and thereafter until his death in
December 1992 was granted a room for work in University College, where he
had taught and written as Professor of Jurisprudence. A principal scholarly
concern of his in these late years was preparing a response to some main
critics of The Concept ofLaw; the fruits of this, a response to his successor in
the chair, Ronald Dworkin, appeared posthumously in 1994, edited by Hart's
closest jurisprudential successor, Joseph Raz, as Postscript to that book's
second edition.
Not long after his seventieth birthday, Hart wrote: "loss of the belief that
[moral judgment and argument] are backed by something more than human
attitudes or policies is, and will continue to be, for many as profound as the
loss of belief in God."' 3 That he had undergone the latter loss, at some early
stage of his life, emerges inferentially from the exceedingly intimate (and
philosophically informed) biography published in 2004.4 In retrospect, at
2. A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004) [hereafter Lacey, Hart], 289.
3. Hart, "Morality and Reality," New York Review of Books (9 March 1978), 35.
4. Lacey, Hart, 18, referring to Hart at age 11-13, speaks of his "later anti-religious
views;" but though she does not affirm, or offer evidence, that he ever had religious belief, it
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least, everything suggests that-at least from the time he began to publish
philosophical work-he also lacked the other belief, that moral judgments can
be really true. But his activities as a philosopher, teacher, mentor, colleague
and friend, like his performance of wartime duties in defense of his country,
his fidelity to his family and his devoted care for their disabled youngest child,
amply display a morally demanding range of virtues.
II
Hart's significance can be understood only when his work is measured
against conceptions of political philosophy that were dominant in Oxford in
the years between Hart's postwar return and the publication of his The
Concept ofLaw. Though these conceptions might be divided, like Hart's own
philosophical formation, between the pre-"linguistic" and the "linguistic,"
they had much in common. As Eric Voegelin emphasizes in his mordant
survey "The Oxford Political Philosophers,"' written in the summer of 1952,
a contemporary pre-linguistic Oxford political philosopher as
methodologically informed and representative as A.D. Lindsay held that
political theory transcends the description of institutions just by being a study
of the "operative ideals," which, as beliefs of citizens, sustain their respective
states in existence. This makes political theory essentially a history of ideas,
with some sorting, arranging and axiomatizing in the mode (as Voegelin
observes) of theology (which takes its principles not from philosophical
considerations but as givens, dogmata). Lindsay's concession that there
remains a question about the "absolute worth" of operative ideals is fleeting:
"the primary business of the political theorist" remains the understanding of
actually operative ideals; "political theory, then, is concerned with fact."6
What then of the linguistic-philosophical approach becoming dominant in
Oxford around 1950? It was approvingly summarized, towards the end of its
dominance, by Anthony Quinton, introducing a book of Oxford Readings in
Political Philosophy. The great works in political philosophy (or,
synonymously, political thought or theory), from Plato and Aristotle to Marx
seems likely that a boy with strong feelings of dutifulness (ibid., 21), raised in a religiously
practicing household, will have had some at least childish faith of the kind that, experience
suggests, might well be lost-abandoned-at some time around 11-14, if not later.
5. The Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953): 97-114, 108.
6. A.D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943),
45; cf. 37-8; also 47: "It is a philosophical discipline, not because it tries to base our conduct
in politics on metaphysics, but because it demands that we should reflect on what we actually
do and will, make explicit to ourselves what we do implicitly, think out the assumptions on
which we as a matter of fact act."
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and Mill, consist, said Quinton, (i) of "factual or descriptive accounts of
political institutions and activities" (political science), (ii) of
"recommendations about the ideal ends that political activity should pursue
and about the way political institutions should be designed in order to serve
those ends" (ideology), and (iii) only to "a small, though commonly crucial
extent," of "conceptual reasonings," the kind of reasonings now known,
according to Quinton, to be the only properly philosophical activity, namely
"classifying and analyzing the terms, statements and arguments of the
substantive, first-order disciplines" or modes of thought, disciplines or modes
of thought which are "concerned with some aspect or region of the
world"-unlike philosophy, which is "conceptual and critical, concerned with
them [those substantive, first-order modes of thought] rather than with the
reality they investigate."7
What makes reasoning "conceptual" and/or "analytical"? How might such
reasoning add anything to descriptions of the institutions found in historically
given societies and "recommendations" (or indeed Lindsay-like historical
accounts) of "ideals"? These questions are left in shadow by Quinton and
indeed by the whole school of philosophers whose self-understanding Quinton
was articulating. Hart too, while framing much of The Concept of Law in
terms of "analysis" of "concepts," says little to make explicit what counts as
conceptual or analytical, or what counts as success in such analysis.8 But
what he proposed as the fruits of his philosophical work in that book, and the
arguments deployed to yield them, together made clear-showed in
action-that political philosophy could and can still be pursued in a way that
is simply not envisaged in Quinton's triad (institutional description,
ideological recommendation, conceptual analysis). That way, moreover, is
continuous with main parts of the tradition of political philosophizing which
that triad so mischaracterizes.
Hart's preface to The Concept of Law speaks of "the political philosophy
of this book." This seems to allude to two of the book's theses or themes. The
first is articulated firmly in terms of "analysis" of "concepts" By "referring,"
7. A.M. Quinton, ed., Political Philosophy, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 1. Note that neither (ii) nor even (i) is an "investigation" of
"reality." Quinton reports (ibid., 2), without disavowing, the "widely held" view that "there
really is no such subject as political philosophy apart from the negative business of revealing
the conceptual errors and methodological misunderstandings of those who have addressed
themselves in a very general way to political issues."
8. He quotes approvingly (The Concept of Law, preface) from J.L. Austin, leader of the
Oxford school of "ordinary language," "analytical" philosophy: "a sharpened awareness of
words [can be used] to sharpen our perception of the phenomena." Here "perception" is an
evasive word for understanding, and "phenomena" for reality, or truths.
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Hart says, to "manifestations" of "the internal point of view: the view of those
who do not merely record and predict behavior conforming to rules, but use
the rules as standards for the appraisal of their own and others' behaviour,"
we can provide an "analysis" that dissipates "the obscurity which still lingers
about [the concepts (which bestride both law and political theory) of the state,
of authority, and of an official]." For while some manifestations of the
internal point of view-those under "the simple regime of primary rules"-are
"most elementary," the "range of what is said and done from the internal point
of view is much extended and diversified" with "the addition... of secondary
rules," an addition that brings with it "a whole set of new concepts ...
[including] the notions of legislation, jurisdiction, validity, and, generally, of
legal powers, private and public." Thus "the combination of primary rules of
obligation with the secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication"
is not only the heart of a legal system but also "a most powerful tool for the
analysis of much that has puzzled both the jurist and the political theorist."9
What matters here is not the various technical problems that commentators
have identified in details of this analysis."1 Rather, it is the argumentation
employed by Hart. This offers to show that the distinctions marked by his
new technical terms-internal and external points of view; primary and
secondary rules-are distinctions not just in "legal thought" or "political
theory" but in the social reality that he often prefers to call "social
phenomena," reality that if it does not exist (as it does in our here and now)
can in favorable circumstances be deliberately and reasonably brought into
being, as state, law, legal system, courts, legislatures, and so forth. And Hart's
argumentation matters because it asserts that alternative "general" accounts
of law failed to recognize both the variety of ways in which rules of law
function and, more fundamentally, the variety offunctions which are served,
or possessed, by social rules and legal systems, and by the main components
of legal systems.
So (in Hart's account) the two fundamental ways in which rules function
as guides to behavior are by imposing obligations and conferring powers. But
if theorists, like Kelsen, deny that this duality of normative functioning is
fundamental, Hart refutes them by pointing to the different functions served
by the two types of rule. Obligation-imposing rules guide both the
9. Ibid., 98-99.
10. Thus, as Joseph Raz showed, not all secondary rules are power-conferring, and not all
power-conferring rules are secondary: "The Functions of Law," in Raz, The Authority of Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 163-79 at 178-9. There is in fact a good deal of
terminological inconsistency and substantive flux in The Concept of Law, in relation to the
distinctions and relations between kinds of rule, as also about the precise characteristics and
content of "internal" and "external" points of view.
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uncooperative (by threatening them with sanctions) and those who are willing
to cooperate if only they are told what is required of them." Power-conferring
rules, understood "from the point of view of those [private persons] who
exercise them," confer on private citizens the "huge and distinctive amenity"
of being "private legislator[s]," "made competent to determine the course of
the law within the sphere of [their] contracts, trusts, wills, and other structures
of rights and duties which [they are thereby] enabled to build"; and the
introduction into society of rules conferringpublic powers such as legislative
or judicial powers to make authoritative enactments and orders "is a step
forward as important to society as the invention of the wheel."' 2  The
difference in normative types (ways of functioning) is grounded on the
differences in social function, that is, on the different reasons for valuing
them, which make exercise of powers "a form of purposive activity utterly
different from performance of duty or submission to coercive control." '3
Although Hart loyally continues to speak of this argumentation as "giv[ing]
some ... analysis of what is involved in the assertion that rules of these two
types exist,"' 4 it is clear that what is going on in his explanation of "the
features of law," and in his claim that his explanation has superior
"explanatory power," is not merely linguistic or conceptual. 5 Rather, it is an
acknowledgement, or reminder, or disclosure, of certain aspects of the human
condition as it really is. His later reflections on the grounding of the
concept(s) of "need and function" enable us to be more precise: in Hart's own
self-understanding, appeals to function are "ways of simultaneously
describing and appraising things by reference to the contribution they make" 6
to a "proper end of human activity."' 7
Those later reflections are articulated by Hart in relation to the second of
the two theses or themes he thought made a contribution to political
philosophy: his discussion, in The Concept of Law's chapter "Law and
Morals," of what he calls "The Minimum Content of Natural Law."'" The
section bearing this title-which might equally well have been "The Minimum
Content of Positive Law" 9-argues vigorously, though with many signs of
11. Concept of Law, 39-40. Strictly speaking, the threat of sanction is created by a distinct
or distinguishable ancillary rule empowering and to some extent obligating officials to impose
penalties on those who violate the obligation-imposing rule.
12. Ibid., 41-2 (emphasis added).




17. Ibid., 191 (emphasis added).
18. Ibid., 193.
19. For the conclusions it reaches on p. 199 concern the "indispensable features of
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anxiety, that we should reject "the positivist thesis that 'law may have any
content."' Besides definitions of words and "ordinary statements of fact,"
there is "a third category of statements: those the truth of which is contingent
on human beings and the world they live in retaining the salient characteristics
which they have. 2 ° More precisely, such contingently universal truths
include statements about what Hart calls "natural necessity," by which, in this
precise context, he means the rational necessity yielded by the conjunction of
a universal human "aim" and various natural facts or "truisms" such as that
human beings are approximately equal to each other in strength and
vulnerability, are limited in their "altruism," understanding and strength of
will, and are subject to scarcity of resources and the need for a division of
labor to exploit them.2' Given the common or universal wish to continue in
existence ("survive"), and the truisms about vulnerability, "what reason
demands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive system.
' 22
Hart's anxiety about this head-on challenge, not only to Kelsenian legal
positivism but to the reigning assumptions (such as Quinton's or Lindsay's)
about method in political philosophy, is manifested in the immediately
preceding, preparatory pages. On the one hand, he there shows that even after
Aristotelian principles of cosmology and physics have been expelled, we
cannot sensibly talk about, or adequately understand, human beings without
having a "teleological view." He instances our talk of natural "human needs
which it is good to satisfy, '23 and of "thefunctions of bodily organs ' 24-all
the talk that makes possible our talk of harm and injury. He sketches, albeit
without unambiguously endorsing or repudiating, a more developed version
of this teleology of human existence and nature: "a condition of biological
maturity and developed physical powers" which "also includes, as its
distinctively human element, a development and excellence of mind and
character manifested in thought and conduct.,
21
municipal law" and reject "the positivist thesis that 'law may have any content."' See also the
phrase "what content a legal system must have" in the 1957/58 essay quoted below at n. 26.
But Hart's attention wavers between features indispensable in any subsisting society (e.g., one
living by primary, pre-legal rules alone) and features indispensable for a legal system (in which
primary rules exist in union with secondary rules and institutions). This last point has been
clarified for me by comments to me by Crist6bal Orrego, whose understanding of Hart is
unrivalled: see his HLA Hart: Abogado del Positivismo Juridico (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1997).
20. Concept of Law, 199-200.
21. Ibid., 194-7.
22. Ibid., 198.
23. Ibid., 190 (Hart's emphases).
24. Ibid., 191 (Hart's emphasis).
25. Ibid., 190.
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But on the other hand, just at this point he shrinks back, declaring that
"what makes sense of this mode of thought and expression is ... the tacit
assumption that the proper end of human activity is survival, and this rests on
the simple contingent fact that most men most of the time wish to continue in
existence."26 This drastically limited-and deeply ambiguous27-conception
of "the proper end of human activity" he ascribes to Hobbes and Hume, whose
"modest" or "humble" conception of human ends should be preferred to the
"more complex and debatable" conceptions of Aristotle or Aquinas. Hart
gives no sign, in this book, of noticing that survival, even when we ignore its
ambiguities, is quite inadequate, as an aim or end, to account for the
developed "excellences of mind and character." The inadequacy goes further,
for concern to survive does not begin to account for the fundamental elements
in his concept of law, the secondary rules introduced (as his first theme or
thesis made clear) to remedy the defects-the social problems-which plague
a society governed only by "social morality's" pre-legal "primary rules."
Hart soon tacitly acknowledged this inadequacy. Writing the following
year about "social morality," not as temporally pre-legal but as the standards
acknowledged, over and above the law, even in legally ordered societies, he
articulated universal values, virtues and standards, still on a purportedly
Hobbesian basis but now with an adjusted rationale:
[A]II social moralities.., make provision in some degree for such universal
values as individual freedom, safety of life, and protection from deliberately
inflicted harm.... Secondly,... the spirit or attitude which characterizes the
practice of a social morality is something of very great value and indeed quite
vital for men to foster and preserve in any society. For in the practice of any
social morality there are necessarily involved what may be called formal
values as distinct from the material values of its particular rules or content.
In moral relationships with others the individual sees questions of conduct
from an impersonal point of view and applies general rules impartially to
himself and to others; he is made aware of and takes account of the wants,
expectations, and reactions of others; he exerts self-discipline and control in
adapting his conduct to a system of reciprocal claims. These are universal
26. Ibid., 191. He continues: "The actions which we speak of as those which are naturally
good to do, are those which are required for survival; the notions of a human need, of harm, and
of the function of bodily organs or changes rests on the same simple fact." See also the slightly
earlier version in "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" [1958], in Hart, Essays
in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 81: "in asking what
content a legal system must have we take this question to be worth asking only if we who
consider it cherish the humble aim of survival in close proximity to our fellows" (emphasis
added).
27. Whose survival is my end? Mine at all costs? My children's, or friend's, at some risk
or even certain cost to my own? My city's or country's... ?
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virtues and indeed constitute the specifically moral attitude to conduct ....
We have only to conduct the Hobbesian experiment of imagining these
virtues totally absent to see that they are vital for the conduct of any
cooperative form of human life and any successful personal life.2"
So cooperation and social rules have a rationale going well beyond survival:
a successful personal life. John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971)
elaborates that kind of rationale in the "thin theory of the good"-the range
of "primary goods" which are good for each one of us because needed
"whatever else one wants."29 Hart himself had said a little more about his
adjusted rationale in 1967: if law "is to be of any value as an instrument for
the realization of human purposes, it must contain rules concerning the basic
conditions of social life .... [W]ithout the protections and advantages that such
rules supply, men would be grossly hampered in the pursuit of any aims."3
Such rules are provided for by social morality, but only in ways that "leave
open to dispute too many questions concerning the precise scope and form of
its restraints." Hence the human need for law, for a legal system which has
a content-that is, which performs functions-of the type indicated in the first
28. Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford
University Press, 1963), 70-71. The passage continues: "No principles of critical morality
which paid the least attention to the most elementary facts of human nature and the conditions
in which human life has to be led could propose to dispense with them."
29. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971),
396-407,433-4. Accordingly, Rawls's "primary goods" ("liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and above all self-respect") are goods that "it is rational to want... whatever else is
wanted, since they are in general necessary for the framing and the execution of a rational plan
of life" (433; also 253,260, 328). Rawls expressly does not contend that "criteria of excellence
lack a rational basis from the standpoint of everyday life," and he grants that "the freedom and
wellbeing of individuals, when measured by the excellence of their activities and works, is
vastly different in value" and "that comparisons of intrinsic value can obviously be made" (328,
329). But he will not allow such differentiations to enter at all into the rational determination
of the basic principles ofjustice (327-32); to do so would be out of line with his "rejection of
the principle of perfection and the acceptance of democracy in the assessment of another's
excellences" (527; also 419).
30. "Problems of the Philosophy of Law" [ 1967] reprinted in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence
and Philosophy, 112. See also 113: "The empirical [not teleological] version of [natural law]
theory assumes only that, whatever other purposes laws may serve, they must, to be acceptable
to any rational person, enable men to live and organize their lives for the more efficient pursuit
of their aims." And 115: "all men who have aims to pursue need the various protections and
benefits which only laws... can effectively confer. For any rational man, laws conferring these
protections and benefits must be valuable, and the price to be paid for them in the form of
limitations imposed by the law on his own freedom will usually be worth paying."
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theme of Hart's account: the union of primary (mostly duty-imposing) and
secondary (mostly power-conferring) rules.3'
Both Hart and Rawls thus broke the bounds of political philosophy as it was
conceived by many in their philosophical circle. They went beyond
describing institutions, and beyond generalizations about historically given
institutions, to offer-not recommendations of ideals-but sober accounts of
what human persons and groups need and rationally desire (that is, have
reason to act for), and of states of affairs and arrangements that are universally
valuable (good) for beings with the nature we have (and so are, and figure in,
and are sources of, reasons for action). To that extent they rejoined the
enterprise launched by Plato and Aristotle, though professing to admit only
what would be admitted by a Hobbes who openly derided the "old moral
philosophers"32 for their talk of what is intrinsically and most completely and
constitutively good for human persons.
There is truth in John Gardner's remark that Hart and Rawls (with some
others unnamed) "together revived political philosophy (and helped to shape
as well as capture the distinctive liberalism of the 1960s) by asserting political
philosophy's relative autonomy from the rest of moral philosophy."33 In so far
as Hart's political philosophy was embedded in a philosophy of law, one
might say more precisely that his attempt was to do political philosophy even
if either there is no moral philosophy or moral philosophy yields a normative
content as minimal as Hobbes professes (alternatives between which Hart's
writings waver or, at best, suspend judgment). And his late-period work in
philosophy of law shows, even more clearly than before, that the attempt
could be sustained only by setting aside his own principal methodological
device-the focus of reflection on the central case of the reality,
"phenomenon," or concept in issue-and looking instead to the marginal and
incompletely reasonable, e.g., adjudicating, understood as it is by judges who
adjudicate without sense of moral responsibility or justification but perhaps
as cynical careerists or Machiavellian promoters of projects foreign or
antithetical to the law's (and to the common good).' On the other hand,
31. Ibid., 114.
32. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 11, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), 63.
33. "Introduction by John Gardner," Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; 1st ed. 1968), xlviii-xlix.
Gardner's phrase "the rest of' hints at the fundamentally questionable character of this project.
He also gives a valuable critical account, at xix-xxiii, of the relationship between Rawls, "Two
Concepts of Rules," Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 4-13, and Hart, "Prolegomenon to the
Principles of Punishment," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 (1959): 1- 26 (essay 1 in
Punishment and Responsibility).
34. In Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 265-8 the questions of(a) the meaning of the
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Hart's late-period work also shows the extent to which he was willing to
admit, at least by implication, that the asserted autonomy of political from
moral philosophy was unsustainable. For against Mill, Nozick, Dworkin, and
Rawls, he objected that attempts to ground basic individual rights or
liberties-rights such as he himself purported to endorse---on arguments of
utility, or on the separateness of persons or their claims to equal respect, or on
hypothesized choices by self-interested but partially ignorant parties in an
original position, are all foredoomed: "[A] theory of basic individual rights
must rest on a specific conception of the human person and of what is needed
for the exercise and development of distinctive human powers."35 And such
a theory of rights "is urgently called for."36
II
Hart's biographer says, credibly, that Law, Liberty and Morality (1963)
"stands, over 40 years after its publication, as the resounding late twentieth-
century statement of principled liberal social policy. Its ideas continue to echo
in both political and intellectual debates"." Its key thesis she identifies
accurately enough: "democratic states are not entitled to enforce moral
standards for their own sake: the mere belief that, say, certain kinds of sexual
activity are immoral is not enough to justify their prohibition."3 She remains
as innocent as Hart of the profound ambiguities which make his book's
judge's statements of the subject's legal duties, and (b) the judge's own grounds for so stating
and enforcing the law, are each treated as a matter of what "may" be the case, as a matter of
logical and psychologically possibility, rather than of what makes good and reasonable sense
for people seeking really good reasons for action. At p. 267, at the end of the last substantive
legal theory that he published, Hart half admits that in arguing "that judicial statements of the
subject's legal duties need have nothing directly to do with the subject's reasons for action," he
is paradoxically denying the insight on which his legal theory was founded, that rules are
reasons for action for subjects as well as officials.
35. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 17. Hart adds, "I am confirmed in this belief
by the fact that when Professor Rawls came to reply to my arguments... the modifications
which he made in his original statement [in A Theory of Justice] of his own theory to meet my
objections appear both to identify the basic liberties for which he argues and their priority over
other values by reference to a conception of the human person and of what is necessary for the
exercise and development of what he calls the moral powers" (ibid.).
36. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 196 (essay first published 1979). This
double-edged formula hints at Hart's deep scepticism about our capacity to make rational
judgments (or "theories") about such matters.
37. Hart, 7 (debates "about a range of social and legal issues such as criminal justice policy,
euthanasia, abortion, and human rights"); 2 ("still read by practically all students of law, politics
and sociology ... the nearest thing to a manifesto for the homosexual law reform movement.")
38. Ibid., 6-7.
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resounding success in shaping debate and policy a dismaying triumph of
confusion and error.
The book opens with a misstatement of English law, an error which points
directly to the whole work's misidentification of the political-philosophical
issues at stake:
The Suicide Act 1961, though it may directly affect the lives of few people,
is something of a landmark in our legal history. It is the first Act of
Parliament for at least a century to remove altogether the penalties of the
criminal law from a practice both clearly condemned by conventional
Christian morality and punishable by law.39
But though the individual, private act of committing or attempting to commit
suicide ceased to be a crime, the 1961 statute rigorously confirmed, indeed
strengthened, the criminal law's penalties and prohibitions against any social
practice of suicide-against any and every kind of assistance, advice,
promotion, or facilitation of it.4"
Hart went on:
Many hope that the Suicide Act may be followed by further measures of
reform, and that certain forms of abortion, homosexual behaviour between
consenting adults in private, and certain forms of euthanasia will cease to be
criminal offences; for they think that here, as in the case of suicide, the misery
caused directly and indirectly by legal punishment outweighs any conceivable
harm these practices may do.4"
39. Law, Liberty and Morality, Preface, opening sentences (emphases added). (Note: this
Preface appears in the English edition first published in 1963 by Oxford Univerity Press, but
not in the edition published at about the same time by Stanford University Press.)
40. Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, imposes imprisonment for up to fourteen years for any
counseling (advising), procuring, or assisting in advance of or in the act of suicide; and any
attempt to provide such advice or assistance is a serious offence under the general law of
criminal attempts. Since assisting suicide is by s. 2 a primary or substantive, not merely an
ancillary offence, it follows that requesting such assistance in one's own suicide is itself the
(ancillary) offence of inciting the commission of an offence.
4 1. Law, Liberty and Morality. Preface. He went on, unrealistically, to express doubt that
such reforms were likely in the near future. Homosexual acts of adults in private were
decriminalized in 1967, as were most abortions (effective 1968), not to mention the no-fault,
all-on-paper divorce authorized by a statute of 1969. This was already readily predictable in
1963, from, for example, the enactment of the Obscene Publications Act 1959, and the
unsuccessful prosecution of the publishers of Lady Chatterley's Lover in 1960; and in relation
to homosexual acts it was indeed predicted to occur "perhaps at an early date" by Lord Simonds
in the passage from Shaw v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions [ 1962] Appeal Cases 223 at 268,
quoted by Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, 9.
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In all these matters, the structure of the issue at stake was fundamentally the
same and was wholly overlooked by Hart. The issue was, and is: supposing
that the truly private acts of an adult individual, or set of consenting adults,
should and/or did cease to be criminal offences, what should be the policy of
the law, and of society's other governing institutions (e.g., public education),
in relation to the public promotion or facilitating of such acts? 42 After all, in
many states outside the Anglo-American world a sharp distinction of principle
was and is drawn between private andpublic, a distinction well grounded in
the philosophical-theological tradition represented by Aquinas.43 A classic
articulation of this tradition is in art. 19 of the Argentine constitution, a
provision unchanged since 1859 and with antecedents in earlier nineteenth-
century constitutions:
19. The private actions of men which in no way offend [public] order or
public morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved exclusively to God and
exempted from the authority ofjudges.4
In states within this tradition, homosexual sex acts in private were not
criminalized, but-speaking of the mid-twentieth century and
earlier-homosexual practice was severely discouraged by prohibitions on
homosexual prostitution, propaganda, places of public resort, solicitation in
public. spaces, adoption of children, pornography, and so forth. The tradition
finds expression, implicitly, in the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights (1950) which make "morals," implicitly public morals, a
permitted ground of restriction on five of the protected rights and liberties.45
Hart's Law, Liberty and Morality shows no sign, at any point, that its author
42. In the case of euthanasia, most who have reflected seriously on it, even those who think
it morally unobjectionable in itself, conclude that it cannot be regarded as private, since death
always has consequences (often highly beneficial) for others and must always be investigated
by public authority to ensure that what seemed voluntary was truly so; and that the society-wide
consequences of allowing some people to choose to kill others are so unjustly adverse for the
vulnerable that even Hart's projected "some forms of euthanasia" would be a grave public evil.
See especially When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context
(New York: New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 1993); Finnis, "Euthanasia,
Morality, and Law," Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 31 (1998) 1123-45.
43. Summa Theologiae 1-2, q. 100, a. 2c; q. 96, a. 3c; q. 98, a. Ic; and see Finnis, Aquinas:
Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),
223-6 and ch. VII passim.
44. "Las acciones privadas de los hombres que de ningimmodo ofendan al orden y la moral
pfiblica ni perjudiquen a un tercero, estAn solo reservadas a Dios, y exentas de la autoridad de
los magistrados." Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 22 August 1994, art. 19.
45. European Convention on Human Rights (1950), arts. 6(1), 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2).
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was aware of this tradition. Indeed, his two references46 to the countries
where homosexual "acts" were not criminal but homosexuality remained in
general disfavor ignore those countries' legal provisions enforcing public
morality on this matter.
And even when he quotes Lord Simonds articulating the key distinction
with precision, Hart misses it entirely. The law lord said:
Let it be supposed that at some future, perhaps early, date homosexual
practices between adult consenting males are no longer a crime. Would it not
be an offence [at common law] if even without obscenity such practices were
publicly advocated and encouraged by pamphlet and advertisement? 7
Hart simply ignores this issue," dismissing the relevant paragraph as mere
"judicial rhetoric in the baroque manner." 49
Yet these serious deficiencies in Hart's handling of the legal issues are
overshadowed by his mishandling of his principal theoretical topic, the idea
of enforcing morality as such. "Is the fact that certain conduct is by common
standards immoral sufficient to justify making that conduct punishable by
law? Is it morally permissible to enforce morality as such? Ought immorality
46. Law, Liberty and Morality, 52, 68 ("The notion that the overwhelming moral majority
would or even could change heart morally and shed these deep instinctive feelings, if the State
did not reflect in legal punishment their moral views on homosexuality, seems fantastic and is
quite at variance with the experience of those countries where homosexuality between
consenting adults in private is not legally punished").
47. Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 268, quoted by Hart, Law, Liberty and
Morality, 9.
48. In the event, English law followed this course during the thirty-five years after the
decriminalization of private adult homosexual acts in 1967, the publication of advertisements
by private individuals of their availability for (even non-commercial) private homosexual acts
remained an offence at common law (Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v.
Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] Appeal Cases 435, following Lord Simonds in Shaw);
and the statutory prohibition of"importun[ing] in a public place for an immoral purpose" was
repeatedly held to extend to public importuning of adult males by adult males (e.g. Regina v
Goddard 92 Criminal Appeal Reports 185 (1990)). For evidence of Hart's later attitude to
these ways of upholding public morality, and to the supportive but short-lived attempt to
exclude from state schools the promoting among children of favour for homosexual parenting,
adoption, and ways of life, see n. 66 below.
49. He proceeds to distract himself (ibid., 10-11) with two thoughts: (i) that the Law Lords'
approval of the trial judge's direction about "conspiring to corrupt public morals" implies that
"there need.., be no approach to the 'public' nor need the morality in question be 'public' in
any sense other than being the generally accepted morality"; and (ii) that the authorities might
circumvent precise statutory decriminalization by charging the decriminalized act itself under
the common law concept of "corruption of public morals"-something that in fact was never
done, and if attempted would have been unsuccessful on a number of legal grounds.
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as such to be a crime? To this question.. ."50 But here we should interject.
The tradition of political philosophy flowing from Plato and Aristotle would
have answered: "This question" is not one, but at least two. For the fact that
conduct is "by common standards immoral" is never sufficientjustification for
punishing it; common moral standards notoriously may be more or less
immoral. And if "morality as such" means, as Hart presumes, the same as
common moral standards qua common, the same reply applies. But if
"(im)morality as such" refers (as it should) to what critical morality rightly
judges (im)moral, then the tradition divides between (a) the Platonist-
Aristotelian stream which "paternalistically" authorizes penalizing immoral
acts for the sake of the character and well being of those who do or would
otherwise engage in them, and (b) the Thomist tradition which we have seen
articulated in the Argentinian constitution, authorizing penalization only when
the act has a public character and jeopardizes public order or public morality
or the rights of others.
Hart, alas, did not envisage either or any of those responses," but plunged
off in another direction, suggested to him by the ruminations of an English
judge of no philosophic formation, Patrick Devlin. Having pointed to the
pertinent distinction between critical and positive morality, Hart summarized
the question his book tackles: "our question is one of critical morality about
the legal enforcement of positive morality."52 That was indeed Devlin's
artless question. But it was a question that no one ought to take very
seriously. 3 For when one is deliberating about the moral and the immoral,
"positive morality" is never determinative. Of course, customs can earn
normative force in a critical morality; and one cannot reach a critical morality
without working through the morality in which defacto one was brought up.
But positive morality, as such, is nothing other than the set of opinions held,
in fact, by a group of persons, concerning right and wrong actions,
dispositions, etc. Such opinions, as facts about that group's beliefs, can never
50. Ibid., 4.
51. In 1967, revisiting the debate, he begins by reporting (at last) what he calls "the
classical position," corresponding to the Platonist-Aristotelian as sketched above; he ignores the
Thomist position, and says he will have nothing to say about the classical. (The same paragraph
confirms his unawareness of the mainstream Christian (and Thomist) position that the strict
requirements of revealed morality are also natural, that is accessible, under favorable epistemic
conditions, by reason unaided by revelation.) See "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality" in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 248.
52. Law, Liberty and Morality, 20.
53. I am setting aside, as secondary, unfruitfully vague, and lacking in generalisable
evidence, the question (one of fact) debated by Hart and Devlin: Will the non-criminalization
of strongly held moral opinions lead people who hold them to crumble in their allegiance to
society and/or their own morality?
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settle, for the deliberating citizen, what that (or any other) citizen shouldjudge
to be right or wrong.
In Hart's own terminology-employing the fruits of his main analysis in
The Concept of Law-4 -the central case of morality understood from the
internalpoint of view is (what the deliberating person takes to be) critical, that
is, justified, morality. Conscientiously deliberating persons are deliberating
about what they should count as reasons for action, and the bare fact that
others count something a reason does not constitute something a reason
(though it may be persuasive as material for some evidentiary presumption
that those other persons have some good reason for their belief). Indeed, one
is scarcely thinking morally unless one considers that one's deliberated
judgment could be morally right even if no one else now agrees with it. If we
are interested in what "morality as such" requires, references to positive
morality are beside the point: morality as such just is critical (which is not to
say that the deliberating person will succeed in critically judging aright, or that
everyone or indeed anyone will defacto agree with that person's judgment).
Hart's exclusive focus on positive morality cut the debate off from the main
political-philosophic tradition, and from reason. It also generated a casual
presumption that those who uphold a group's morality have no moral reasons
for doing so, or that no one need enquire what those moral reasons might be."
This pernicious presumption has a first manifestation in Hart's never
examined assumptions that "deviations from conventional sexual morality
such as homosexuality afford the clearest examples of offences which do not
54. Note that in The Concept ofLaw's set-piece discussion (168-84) of morality, Hart was
clearly failing to grasp that even the adherents to a widely or universally accepted morality will
each, at least in the central case, be adhering to it not because the others do but because they
each consider it right, that is, consider it justified by its successful articulation of the
requirements of the wellbeing, dignity, honor, excellence, etc., of persons and groups. This
serious failure in Hart's analysis was pointed out by Ronald Dworkin in 1972, who described
what I have called the critical internal point of view in such a case as a "consensus of
independent conviction" (as opposed to a consensus of convention, in which the general
conformity of the group is counted by the individual members as the, or a, reason for their
acceptance of it): "The Model of Rules II" (originally "Social Rules and Legal Theory," Yale
Law Journal 81 [1972]: 855-890) in Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1972), 53. In the posthumously published Postscript to The Concept
of Law, Hart conceded all this (255-6), admitting that the book had not provided "a sound
explanation of morality, either individual or social." He had in fact been aware of this error,
which he recognized as "large," since at latest 1980: see Lacey, Hart, 335-6.
55. The recent counterpart to this resultant of Hart's mistake is Dworkin's: Dworkin, A
Matter ofPrinciple (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 67-8,368. Analysis and
critique: Finnis, "A Bill of Rights for Britain? The Moral of Contemporary Jurisprudence,"
Proceedings oftheBritish Academy 52 (1986): 303-331 at 309-311; and "Universality, Personal
and Social Identity, and Law," (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=-1094277.
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harm others,"56 and that "sexual morals [are obviously] determined.., by
variable tastes and conventions."57 Test this claim by reference to that part of
sexual morality (by no means the most significant or interesting part) on
which Hart chose to focus. Those who actually judge homosexual acts, like
other non-marital sex acts, immoral, while they might grant that the private
homosexual sex acts of two already morally corrupt adults in private do no
harm, can argue with force that predisposing children to approve of adult
homosexual sex acts (and/or to be disposed to engage in them when of age)
is gravely and unjustly harmful to the child and to society. For, like other
misconceptions of what is good and bad in sexual choices, this approval
involves the child, and eventually the society, in a gross misunderstanding of
the contribution sex acts have to make-and of the act-descriptive conditions
without which such acts cannot make it-to marriage as the indubitably most
favorable and fairest milieu for the procreation and upbringing of children and
for the lifelong fulfillment of the married persons themselves.58 Sexual
morals, when upheld not only as justified but in a critical reflective manner,
or in a community or tradition that has given really critical attention to
justifying its judgments, are obviously not determined merely or primarily by
variabl6 tastes and conventions, but by living judgments about fundamental
features of human nature-that is of the conditions for human well-being and
fulfillment-features philosophically explored, essentially without deference
to taste or convention,59 by Plato and Aristotle and more fully and adequately
by Aquinas.
The issues at stake in sexual morality are such that sensible argument and
deliberation about it will be no mere juxtaposition of "recommendations of
ideals." It will involve attention to human needs, opportunities and makeup
(both individual and social"0), to biological, physical, psychological realities
and to such spiritual possibilities as commitment, in friendship, to paternity
and maternity. If the Bloomsbury set-to speak only of the ideas with which
Hart's closest circle in the 1930s and after were imbued-propose a critical
56. Law, Liberty and Morality, preface.
57. Ibid., 73.
58. See Finnis, "Natural Law and the Classical Tradition," sec. 19 ("Law and Sexuality"),
in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules Coleman and Scott
Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 41-45; and works cited in n. 64 below.
59. See Plato's telling remarks about the counter-cultural character of his own judgments
about homosexual acts, and about the opposition they meet from people who are led by their
unintegrated desires: Laws VIII, 835c, 839b.
60. Social needs include, above all, an adequate and voluntary response to the fact recalled
in Shakespeare's Erasmian Sonnet XI: "If all were minded so," that is, not to procreate, "the
times should cease, / And threescore year would make the world away."
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sexual ethic in which little is forbidden save sexual jealousy, and friendship
even between spouses is supposed to be unaffected by sexual acts with others,
a critical moral response can uphold the traditional position-not as
traditional, Christian or conventional-but as far superior in realism about
human character, opportunity and fulfillment. Such a response cannot be
elaborated here. Enough to say two things.
First, the critical moral response to the Bloomsbury set's now widely
accepted and practiced assumptions about sexual intimacies is fundamental
not only to individual ethics but also to political philosophy. Plato's thought
experiments about sharing of sexual partners in his Republic were what
Aristotle chose as a first priority for critical demolition in his Politics.6' But
Plato himself had pre-emptively adopted the essential results of that critique
in his own last work, the Laws, where sex acts of a behaviorally non-
procreative kind are treated as immoral, and their promotion a threat to the
political community, because of their incompatibility with stable, loyal and
procreative friendship between man and wife.62 That the nuclear family (with
its grandparents and grandchildren) is the "the natural and fundamental group
unit of society" was as evident to the founders of political philosophy as to the
culturally diverse authors, sponsors and signatories of art. 16(3) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights--evident, that is, not as a mere
assumption but as a thesis warranted by careful attention to persons, world,
and society, and by dialectical argument against objections. In the philosophy
of practical reason (in which individual ethics, political philosophy and legal
theory have a primary place), that warranted thesis can be seen to be among
practical thinking's first principles, picking out marriage as one of the basic
aspects of human wellbeing.63
Second, direct ethical engagement with the Bloomsbury ethic can with
critical justification unfold an understanding' of sex acts: that they have full
intelligibility as, and only as, marital, that is, as expressing, actualizing and
enabling the spouses to experience commitment to marriage's uniquely
appropriate context for procreative friendship and responsibility; and that that
intelligibility is lost insofar as spouses hold themselves conditionally ready to
engage (or be complicit in others engaging) in non-marital sex acts, as they do
if they even approve of non-marital sex acts. On such a view-implicit in the
61. Politics II, 1-2: 1260b37-1264b3; Firmis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), 144-6, 58-9.
62. Laws VIII, 835b - 842a.
63. On Aquinas's presentation of marriage as the subject of a first principle of practical
reason, see Finnis, Aquinas, 82, 97-8, 143-54.
64. See op. cit., supra n. 58; Finnis, "Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good," The Monist
91 (2008): 396-414, and works there cited.
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common-sense of millennia-the sexual "jealousy" (better: resentment)
tabooed by the Bloomsbury ethic is both predictable and natural because the
sex act's unique appropriateness for expressing exclusive comrnitment,fides,
is natural (that is, fully intelligible); and the ethic of sexual liberation is a
recipe for-to use Hart's favorite word in Law, Liberty andMorality-misery.
Its malign results include the misery induced by the side-effects of efforts,
even successful efforts, to suppress and contemn one's own or others'
reactions to want offides. But the miseries to be counted extend also to the
wider effects of sexual "liberation" on children in their years of radical
dependency, vulnerability and need; and on those killed or damaged by
damaged children; and quite generally on the vulnerable.65
The "distinctive liberalism of the 1960s" was distinguished by concern that
its challenges to the social enforcement of moral condemnations of types of
conduct should not seem to challenge those moral condemnations
themselves. 66 This concern doubtless contributed to Hart's resolute non-
engagement with any part of the real case for those condemnations and their
direct or indirect enforcement. If the misconceived and sterile "Hart-Devlin
debate," and Hart's plausible success in it, had a large and long-lasting social
impact, that suggests a decay going wider than just in the practice of political
philosophy.67
65. Jenifer Hart, Ask Me No More, 38, defends the Bloomsbury set's sex ethic as natural;
remarks that the set's founder members "themselves seem not to have felt sexual jealousy" (here
both the word "themselves" and the word "seem" are significant); and appeals to lines 149-63
of Shelley's Epipsychidion, contemning fidelity to "one chained friend" and claiming that "to
divide is not to take away." The year after composing and publishing it, the poet repudiated it
as misbegotten, misconceived: ""the Epipsychidion I cannot look at; the person whom it
celebrates was a cloud instead of a Juno, and poor Ixion starts from the centaur that was the
offspring of his own embrace...." (Letter to John Gisborne, June 22, 1822.) No need to dwell
upon his wife's suicide and other miseries that Shelley's "dividing" of his sexual attentions
actually brought about for women and children.
66. When, by the 1980s, that liberalism had extensively succeeded in changing laws and
public policies, but still had further to go, these restrictions fell away. Thus Lacey, Hart, 356,
reports: "His reaction [in the 1980s] to Thatcherite social policies, particularly in the areas of
education and sexual morality, reached the level of outrage. The enactment of 'clause 28',
which prohibited local government from 'promoting' or using funds to 'support' propagation
[in schools administered by local government] of the message that homosexual relationships ['as
a pretended family relationship'] were of equal moral value to heterosexual ones, drew his
particular wrath. 'I loathe it...,' he told David Sugarman, who interviewed him in 1988."
67. The climax of the lectures on knowledge and the good in Plato's Republic given in
Hart's first years as a student by his tutor and friend H.W.B. Joseph and published, without
comment or commentary, by Hart in 1948, is Joseph's conclusion about the point ofthe allegory
of the Cave (Rep. 514a-517a): that what we need is not just intellectual formation from
inevitable ignorance, but conversion "from a plight into which we ought not to have come" but
have come through the "evil training" of social institutions; for though leaving people free to
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European states in the early twenty-first century move ever more clearly out
of the social and political conditions of the 1960s into a trajectory of
demographic and cultural decay; circumscription of political, religious and
educational speech and associated freedoms; pervasive untruthfulness about
equality and diversity; population transfer and replacement by a kind of
reverse colonization; and resultant internal fissiparation foreshadowing, it
seems, ethnic and religious inter-communal miseries of hatred, bloodshed and
political paralysis reminiscent of late twentieth century Yugoslavia's or the
Levant's. So the time seems ripe for a wider reflection on whether late
twentieth-century political philosophies so characteristic, so suasive, so
victorious as Hart's correspond or correlate with these evils, or indeed
contribute to their onset or progression.
That Hart had a political philosophy at all was an act of conscious
resistance to skepticism. This resistance extended beyond the setting aside of
methodological skepticism such as Quinton representatively articulated. It
was particularly evident in Hart's repudiation of twentieth century behaviorist
(naturalist, scientistic) reductionism, whether that took the form of
Scandinavian or American legal "realism," reducing the normative to the
predictive or magical or diagnostic, or of Hobbesian or Austinian accounts of
choice and action as mere predominant desire and muscular contraction, or of
mid-twentieth century criminological/penological theories denying
responsibility by treating human behavior as merely a more or less predictable
cause of preventable harm.6"
But the resistance was itself shaped and limited in its extent and content by
Hart's own skepticism about something more foundational, the truth-value,
and truth, of moral judgments (that is, as we have seen, of moral judgments
intended as critical because asserted as true, sound, really justified). Only
very late in his career did Hart allow himself to affirm in print this deep-going
develop "naturally," without such institutions, would only allow other pressures to distort and
block sound judgment, it is in fact "the pressure of lies that acts on us in States as they now are;
and only by a hard struggle can a man reach, and only in the face of obloquy and opposition
from those whom it disturbs can he teach, the truth." H.W.B. Joseph, Knowledge & the Good
in Plato's "Republic, " ed. H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), 43-4. It was
not Hart's fate to have to face much obloquy on account of his teaching about critical morality's
exclusions and requirements in politics and law, teaching which found prompt favour and
recognition (Lacey, Hart, 274) from the mid-sixties Labour government which superintended
the liberalization of laws on pornography, abortion, homosexual acts, and divorce.
68. So "skepticism" or one or other of its cognates appears as something to be opposed in
almost all the nine essays in Punishment and Responsibility.
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doubt, or rather denial.6 9 But a determining consideration, throughout The
Concept ofLaw, was that neither author nor reader, in taking a stand on issues
in political or legal philosophy, need make any judgment about whether there
are any "true principles of right conduct rationally discoverable,"7 or whether
instead moral judgments are but "expressions of changing human attitudes,
choices, demands, or feelings."'" In that book, the explicit attempt to "evade
these philosophical difficulties"72 drives the reduction of law's rationale to
survival, the later repudiated assimilation of moral judgment to articulation of
positive ("consensus of convention") morality, and the pervasive refusal to
identify a central case of the internal point of view.
And in the discourse about the proper limits of the criminal law, the
skepticism about morality is surely one primary motivation for the falling
away from the level of Plato, Aristotle and Mill to the essentially
unphilosophical and irrelevant dialectic with Devlin. The popular success of
that dialectic is a measure of the widespread loss of philosophical culture in
the 104 years between On Liberty and Law, Liberty and Morality. For the
first chapter of Mill's book makes the truly foundational issues explicit. It
does so by its combined contentions (i) that state coercion may well be
justifiable in the interests of the improvement of immature individuals or
societies, or to protect a state where relaxation of "the mental discipline" of
69. See n. 3 above, and the 1986 review of Bernard Williams discussed in the article cited
in n. 70 below, at pp. 47-50.
70. Concept of Law, 186. Right here the book employs a version of the simile that Hart's
notebooks from the book's earliest gestation mark out as the (or at the very least, a primary)
problematic in the book's conception: "the disputants on one side seem to say to those on the
other, 'You are blind if you cannot see this' only to receive in reply, 'You have been
dreaming."' See Lacey, Hart, 222; Finnis, "On Hart's Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact,"
American Journal of Jurisprudence 52 (2007): 51.
71. Concept of Law, 168.
72. Ibid., explicitly reaffirmed in the posthumous Postscript, ibid, 253-4. Orrego argues
plausibly that Hart's motivation in postulating and holding to this agnosticism of legal
philosophy about the objectivity or truth of moral judgments (even while, in his late work,
casting doubt on the objectivity of legal rules and judgments as reasons for action!) was, in large
measure, to protect legal positivism against the charge-damaging in the post-War years when
the critique and punishment of Nazi wickedness made ethical skepticism unattractive-that it
was a theory committed to ethical skepticism and/or relativism: Crist6bal Orrego, "Hart's Last
Legal Positivism: Morality Might Be Objective; Legality Certainly is Not," in Law, Morality
and Legal Positivism, ed. Kenneth Einar Himma (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 77-8.
Orrego also shows, ibid., 75, that in my "Law and What I Truly Should Decide," American
Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (2003): 107-29 at 11 n. 4, 1 was misunderstanding Hart's tortured
discussion in his Essays on Bentham, 266-7 as insinuating moral skepticism, when in fact Hart
(though, as other evidence shows, a moral skeptic) was there implying skepticism about the
objectivity of legal reasons for action.
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any citizens might result in the overthrow of the state by "foreign attack or
internal commotion," and (ii) that the "salutary... effects of freedom" in
accomplishing the necessary minimum of improvement in or of modern
societies are "permanent" effects, so that the qualifications on the "principle
of liberty" that were articulated in the first of those contentions can now, with
us, be simply set aside. Hart criticized On Liberty for relying on a
presumption of "middle-aged" psychological caution and stability to justify
rejecting paternalism in relation even to uncontroversial harms.73 But he, and
with him the whole extensive academic and popular discourse he inspired, left
unexamined the much more deep-going and far-reaching issues raised by each
of those Millian contentions.
That failure was symptomatic of a wider failure to examine a question
extensively studied by Plato and Aristotle: What elements of individual and
societal makeup are presupposed by political institutions capable of upholding
justice and freedom and the practice of political philosophy itself?. Primary
and indispensable in such an examination will be two inter-linked issues, (a)
the preconditions of shared sympathies, memories, temperaments, beliefs and
aspirations necessary to uphold the polity's existence against external enemies
and internal subversion and against want of civic spirit, of allegiance, of give
and take, and of willingness to make personal and familial sacrifices for the
common good, and (b) the ways of educating children, and the structure of
procreative and familial relationships (and related socio-economic and
political practices), needed to maintain a population and its necessary civic
spirit, not least its will to uphold a liberty neglected by Hart and his followers,
the collective liberty of national self-determination. But, though Hart sketches
a kind of analogue to Aristotle's ascent to the political via families and
neighborhoods-in The Concept ofLaw's ascent to the legal, up from the pre-
legal social order of "social morality's" ".primary rules" sustainable or
tolerable only in "a small community closely knit by ties of kinship, common
sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable environment ' 74-his
consideration of these rules never asks whether they include such rules as may
be needed to order procreation and education within such a community.75 And
73. Law, Liberty and Morality, 33. Hart accordingly accepted a limited measure of
paternalism in relation to more or less physical or psycho-somatic harms.
74. Concept of Law, 92, 169, 198.
75. Contrast Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 12: "Between husband and wife friendship
seems to exist by nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples even more than to form
polities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the polity.. human beings
live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life; for
from the start their functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different; so they
help each other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It is for these reasons
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his repeated consideration of the disunity between officials and others in a
legally ordered state focuses on the threat of internal oppression, not on the
preconditions for the society's sustainability.1
6
As for Law, Liberty and Morality, its evasion or oversight of all questions
of activities affecting public morality, as distinct from the truly private acts of
consenting adults, results in thoroughgoing neglect of the question what
conditions of procreation and education and self-understanding are needed to
sustain political culture, and philosophy, and indeed the political community
itself in face of threats external or internal. A liberalism that consciously
evades "material" moral issues,77 as controversial or non-neutral, is prone
indeed to evade essential facts, causalities, inter-dependencies and the like,
even when these tend to determine outcomes fundamentally. And prone to
neglect the rational force of valid slippery slope arguments,7" which point to
the significance of adopting principles thatjustify not only actions and effects
now desired but also actions and effects which others may well desire in some
future time, perhaps imminent.79
that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship. But this friendship may
be based also on virtue, if the parties are good; for each has his or her own virtue and they will
delight in that fact. And children seem to be a bond of union (which is the reason why childless
people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is common holds
them together." (trans. W.D. Ross in Complete Works ofAristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
76. See e.g., Concept ofLaw, 117 ("the sheep [members of the disaffected majority] might
end on the slaughterhouse.")
77. See the passage quoted above at n. 28. In Law, Liberty and Morality, 24, Hart casually
presumes that the (unimportant and unclarified) issue of political morality he was debating with
Devlin is "surely, more interesting" than any question about "the content of the morality to be
enforced."
78. See Douglas Walton, Slippery Slope Arguments (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992). Hart's published reflections on abortion display no interest in the implications or
consequences of introducing into law and public policy approved killing of vulnerable innocent
human beings, whether at the beginning or the end of a lifespan or in other conditions of
vulnerability or of inconvenience or risk to others.
79. Hart was aware, as he told me on his return from Australia in 1971, that in his advocacy
of abortion law reform in the 1960s he had failed to anticipate the scale of the institutional and
social changes that would-with what he now saw to be quasi-inevitability-follow the removal
of the criminal prohibition of certain specified classes of interventions by doctors on their
patients. For the general point, without the admission of personal non-anticipation, see Hart,
"Abortion Law Reform: The English Experience," Melbourne University Law Review 8 (1971-
2): 408-9. Of the benefits of the liberalization, Hart put first (ibid., 400-402, 411) the reduction
in illegitimate births, which since he wrote have multiplied (as a proportion of all births in
England and Wales) over five-fold. He was (402) unwilling to believe that the change in the
law had led or would lead many women to change their sexual habits or attitudes to
contraception.
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Thus Hart's normative political philosophy has little indeed to say about the
inter-relations of common good, justice and liberty in a nation whose liberty-
minded citizens have largely given up procreating--or rather,
bearing-children at a rate consistent with their community's medium-term
survival, and whose law, considered in its much-obscured implications, marks
out for them a path towards, first the loss of national self-determination;" ° and
then their own replacement, as a people, by other peoples, more or less
regardless of the incomers' compatibility of psychology, culture, religion or
political ideas and ambitions, or the worth or viciousness of those ideas and
ambitions; and finally to the ruinous loss of most or much that Hart worked
for, or took for granted, as precious. So there arises an interesting question for
reflective speculation. How far were the deficiencies of political philosophies
such as Hart's encouraged by-even as they, perhaps unwillingly (or at least
reluctantly),8 encouraged-the "inclination" or "mood" depicted by Voegelin
in 1952: the inclination to take one's society's existence, especially when it
has had "a long and glorious history," for granted "as part of the order of
things," "an inclination to disregard the structure of reality, of relaxing into
the sweetness of existence, of a decline of civic morality, of a blindness to
obvious dangers, and a reluctance to meet them with all seriousness," the
mood of late, disintegrating societies no longer willing to fight for their
existence82 (an existence which, one may add, is also a precondition for their
serving the common good of peoples and territories beyond their own)? Or
were those political-philosophical deficiencies encouraged instead by the
contrasting predispositions mentioned by Voegelin in the same passage:
predispositions to an activism shaped by a kind of faith, such as liberal or
Marxist or National Socialist beliefs in essentially inevitable cultural
80. See my discussion, building on Raz's, in Part V of Finnis, "Universality, Personal and
Social Identity, and Law."
81. See, e.g., Lacey, Hart, 268-71, especially the 1987 interview quoted at 270, in which
Hart says "I think I am torn between my theories and my emotions here." He was speaking of
his support for an open borders policy ("a country to which anybody is entitled to come") and
his opinion that "what is valuable is an inherited culture, and any sharp discarding of that is
objectionable, and indeed monstrous ...... I suspect that it's too much to demand that people
should disregard the ties of kith and kin absolutely - it's an ethic of fantasy that these could be
put aside."
82. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1952), 168. Not long after Hart had asked me to contribute a book to his series,
and to call it Natural Law andNatural Rights, I read this book and the contemporaneous article
on Oxford political philosophers. My book articulates a philosophical theory offering to supply
the element missing, as Voegelin's article observes, in virtually all the Oxford political
philosophers, the element he named ("Oxford Political Philosophers," n. 5 above, at 103, 109),
I think obscurely, "a science of principles" and "philosophical anthropology."
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progress? After all, Mill's activist "doctrine of liberty," as Hart called it,
confessedly rested on just such a faith, in "the salutary permanent effects of
freedom" 83-that is, we should now say, on sub-rational, spiritually disordered
faith in a course of history that had brought societies such as ours up to a
plateau of progress from which there would not be a falling off. Or was it
neither of those predispositions, but instead no more than Oxford
philosophers' standard bad practice of discussing, say, Plato's or Mill's
"theories" and "doctrines" with a kind of detachment from their deepest truth-
conditions? For these "truth-conditions," taken broadly and adequately,
include not only those great authors' reasonable will to get beyond theories
and doctrines to the realities (actual and realizable) which, along with
coherence, are the measure of the conceptual, but also careful attention by
both authors and readers to the realities and goods 4 without which it would
be impossible or senseless to engage in philosophical inquiry of any kind. 5
Perhaps, rather, all three predispositions to error contributed to the
philosophical deficiencies I have indicated. All are encouraged by aversion
to acknowledging reality's full range and partly transcendent structure, the
deep aversion which I mentioned in section I's last paragraph's first sentences.
83. Mill, On Liberty (1859), ch. 1, last paragraph but two.
84. On the fundamental importance of conceiving the study of ethics (including political
theory) as apractical undertaking, see Finnis, Fundamental ofEthics (Oxford and Washington,
DC: Oxford University Press and Georgetown University Press, 1983), 1-6.
85. See Finnis, "Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse," The American Journal of
Jurisprudence 43 (1999): 53-73; also (with Habermas's reply) in Ratio Juris 12 (1999): 354-
373. Obviously, Plato's reflections (taken up in that article) on the will to seek truth and
friendship, and on the opposing will to domination, need to be extended to accommodate such
historically and politically important realities as the sub-theological, sub-philosophical will
(such as Mill's-or perhaps at least his wife Harriet Taylor's) to believe in ineluctable progress
and avert the eyes from the somewhat fragile preconditions for a sustainable civil order (and
social practice of philosophy).
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